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NATIVE AMERICAN CRIME VICTIMS DESERVE JUSTICE:
A RESPONSE TO JENSEN AND ROSENQUIST
STEPHEN D. EASTON*
I. INTRODUCTION
Under the United States Code, the primary duty of the United
States Attorney is to "prosecute for all offenses against the United
States,"' including major crimes in Indian 2 country. 3 Messrs. Jen-
sen and Rosenquist would have the United States Attorney abdi-
cate this responsibility by ignoring these major crimes, which
include murder, manslaughter, kidnapping,4 and rape,5 when a
* Attorney, Pearce & Durick Law Firm, Bismarck, North Dakota.; J.D., 1983, Stanford
Law School, Stanford, California; B.A., 1980, Dickinson State College, Dickinson, North
Dakota; A.A., 1978, Northland Community College, Thief River Falls, Minnesota. From
1990 through 1993, the author served as United States Attorney for the District of North
Dakota.
This article could not have been written without the considerable research assistance
provided by Jenell Nilles, Judy Swanson, Carol Fricke, Dennis Fisher, Linda Akers, Donna
Elkins, Deborah Gustafson, and Ezra Friedman, and the word processing done by Jeanne
Feist and June Hintz. The author also gratefully acknowledges the input of those who read
and commented on drafts, including Julie Oseid, Cameron Hayden, Lynn Jordheim, Lynn
Crooks, Jerome Kettleson, Gary Annear, Keith Reisenauer, Clare Hochhalter, Michael
McMahon, and Scott Schneider. Most importantly, the author is, as always, indebted to
Marivern Easton, who reviewed drafts, provided encouragement, assisted with cite
checking, and tolerated the absences that this project required.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 547 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
2. The relevant sections of the United States Code use the term "Indian." See, e.g., 18
U.S.C. §§ 1151, 1152, and 1153 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). The United States Code does not
contain a precise definition of "Indian" for purposes of criminal jurisdiction, but an
individual who is an enrolled member of a tribe is generally considered to be an Indian. See
FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 19-27 (1982 ed.) (discussing the
definition of "Indian"); Timothy D. Leonard, The United States Attorney's Office and
Criminal Law in Indian Country, in Sovereignty Symposium II: The Dialogue Continues 6
(1990).
In this article, the terms "Indian" and "Native American" will be used interchangeably.
3. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152 (providing that, subject to certain exceptions, "the general laws of
the United States as to the punishment of offenses committed in any place within the sole
and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States ... shall extend to the Indian country") and
1153 (stating that if an Indian commits one of the offenses listed in the statute, he "shall be
subject to the same law and penalties as all other persons... within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the United States") (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
4. See 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
5. See id.; 18 U.S.C. § 2241 (1988).
Jensen and Rosenquist protest this response's discussion of all of the crimes covered by
the Indian Major Crimes Act, see infra notes 41-47 and accompanying text, suggesting that
their analysis only applies to some of these offenses (without stating how the reader is to
distinguish between these two categories, see infra note 119). The authors inaccurately
state, "[TIhe authors have never proposed that the crimes of murder, rape, or kidnapping
go unpunished .... ." See Jensen and Rosenquist, Satisfaction of a Compelling Government
Interest or Simply Two Convictions for the Price of One?, 69 N.D. L. REV. 915, at n.3 (1993)
[hereinafter Compelling Interest].
It is important to note that Jensen and Rosenquist's original position suggested that the
United States Attorney should never prosecute an offense if the defendant was originally
prosecuted for the same offense by a tribal court. As a result, this response has argued that
all provable Indian Major Crimes Act violations, including murders, rapes, and kidnappings,
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misdemeanor prosecution has occurred in tribal court.
The authors' demand for this extraordinary dereliction of duty
is not based upon any alleged violation of the constitution's double
jeopardy clause, for they readily concede that prosecutions by sep-
arate sovereigns (i.e., the tribe and the federal government) do not
violate this provision.6 Rather, the authors' demand for federal
nonaction in the face of major crimes is based upon: (a) an incor-
rect interpretation of an internal policy of the Department of Jus-
tice7 that is, by its very terms, inapplicable to Indian country
crimes;8 (b) an incomplete 9 "survey" of defense practitioners that
yielded predictable results;' ° and (c) the authors' subjective
views" from their limited 12 experience in federal cases.
should be prosecuted whenever the resources of the United States Attorney's Offices and
related agencies so permitted. Although the authors have now qualified their position by
stating, "It is not the intent of this article to advocate that the federal government should
refrain from all prosecutions where a tribal court has previously acted," id. at text
accompanying n.8, their analysis is still tainted by their previous failure to distinguish
among the Indian Major Crimes Act offenses. For example, the survey taken by the authors
did not distinguish between "the crimes of murder, rape, or kidnapping," id. at n.3, and
crimes by "juveniles and petty thieves," id. at 94. See id. at text accompanying n.95. It is
reasonable to assume that several of the forty survey responses dealt with murder or rape
prosecutions, and that substantially less than forty responses concerned crimes by juveniles
or petty thieves. In addition, an entire section of the authors' article discusses a case
involving one of the three crimes that they now admit is worthy of federal prosecution, i.e.,
rape. See id. at text accompanying nn. 136-146 (discussing United States v. Lester, 992 F.2d
174 (8th Cir. 1993)). In light of the authors' focus on this case, they should not complain that
this response similarly focuses on this crime and an equally serious crime, murder.
In the final analysis, the point of this response remains constant: All Indian Major
Crimes Act offenses are serious. As this author has noted, see infra note 105, some of the
offenses are admittedly more serious than others, but all are serious, see infra text
accompanying notes 104-106 and note 119. All Indian Major Crimes Act offenses represent
serious intrusions upon the peace, dignity, and bodies or property of the victims of these
crimes. To the extent possible given the limited resources of the United States Attorneys'
Offices and related agencies, all provable Indian Major Crimes Act offenses should result in
federal prosecution. As Jensen and Rosenquist admit in the statement quoted at the
beginning of this footnote, a mere misdemeanor prosecution of these serious crimes leaves
these crimes, for all practical purposes, "unpunished." See Compelling Interest, supra, at
n.3. The author of this response admits to a complete lack of understanding of how a
prosecution of a provable violation of a felony statute that outlaws "major" crimes can be
considered an abuse of prosecution. See id. at text following n.9.
6. See Compelling Interest, supra note 5, at text accompanying nn.25-63.
7. See id. at text accompanying nn.64-95.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 67-79.
9. See infra text following note 93.
10. See Compelling Interest, supra note 5, at text accompanying n.95; see also infra
text accompanying notes 85-93. The authors also claim to be relying upon undisclosed,
unquoted, and uncited "comments from the practicing bar." Id. at text accompanying n.86.
11. The authors state, without citation or other objective support, that the prosecution
practices of the United States Attorney's Office for the District of North Dakota are
"alarming," and that "it is the authors' opinion that the prosecutions are motivated by
reasons other than governmental interest." Compelling Interest, supra note 5, at text
following nn.139 and 95, respectively. The article also refers to "perceived" abuses by the
United States Attorney's Office. Id. at text accompanying n.5, n.94, and text following
n.146. Because no source is cited for these perceptions, the reader must assume that they
are the authors' own perceptions.
12. The authors draw conclusions from their "personal experience," Compelling
940
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According to Jensen and Rosenquist, if a tribe has prosecuted
a defendant for a crime arising out of the same events, the United
States Attorney should usually refrain from prosecuting that
defendant. Their article suggests that the Office of the United
States Attorney for the District of North Dakota has been over-
zealous in its prosecution of major crimes occurring on the state's
Indian reservations. The United States Attorney's Office should
perhaps welcome this criticism. In the seventies and early eight-
ies, no less than three separate entities issued reports criticizing
United States Attorneys for underprosecuting Indian country
major crimes. These entities were the United States Commission
on Civil Rights, 3 the National American Indian Court Judges
Association,' 4 and even the Department of Justice itself."5 Per-
haps the charge of overprosecution by Jensen and Rosenquist, who
are attorneys who represent defendants in criminal cases,' 6 dem-
Interest, supra note 5, at text preceding n.86, but cite only two federal criminal cases,
United States v. Azure, No. C2-92-40-01, see id. at nn.87-89 and accompanying text, and
United States v. J.A.L., J2-91-88-02 (D. N.D. 1992), see id. at nn.90-91, in which either of the
authors represented a defendant.
The subtitle of Jensen and Rosenquist's article, "Two Convictions for the Price of One"
(emphasis added) further suggests that the authors' experience in major crimes trials is
limited. No attorney experienced in these cases would ignore the well documented
emotional, time, and financial "costs" paid during pretrial and trial procedures by victims of
violent crimes such as armed robbery, rape, or child sexual abuse. See, e.g., FINAL REPORT,
PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, at 5-10 (1982) [hereinafter FINAL
REPORT]; see generally Julie Oseid, Note, Defendants' Rights in Child Witness Competency
Hearings: Establishing Constitutional Procedures for Sexual Abuse Cases, 69 MINN. L. REV.
1377 (1985). A felony prosecution also requires substantial expenditures of the resources of
prosecutors, defense attorneys, the judicial system, and, often, the prison system.
The authors note that they have considerable experience in the criminal justice system.
See Compelling Interest, supra note 5, at n.86. Nonetheless, the authors only identified two
cases where they represented a federal criminal defendant who previously was prosecuted
in tribal court. The experience of the authors of a law review article would ordinarily be
irrelevant. In this instance, however, the authors have brought their experience into issue
by drawing incorrect conclusions based upon this experience. See supra note 12.
13. The United States Commission on Civil Rights stated:
The high rate of declination of prosecution of major crimes offenses by United
States attorneys has been a source of dissatisfaction in the Indian community for
some time. Precise statistics are not maintained by Federal law enforcement
agencies, but it appears that in excess of 80 percent of major crimes cases, on the
average, presented to United States attorneys are declined for prosecution.
Offenses covered by the Major Crimes Act are serious felony offenses.
Ordinarily, there is no alternative to Federal prosecution other than referral for
prosecution within the tribal system, where the 6-month limitation on sentences
that can be imposed is often an inadequate sanction for the seriousness of the
offense.
UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, INDIAN TRIBES: A CONTINUING QUEST
FOR SURVIVAL 154-55 (1981) [hereinafter UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS].
14. See NATIONAL AMERICAN INDIAN COURT JUDGES ASSOCIATION, JUSTICE AND THE
AMERICAN INDIAN: FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF CRIMES COMMITTED ON INDIAN
RESERVATIONS 33-41, 43-44 (1974) [hereinafter JUSTICE AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN].
15. See UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 13, at 145 nn.44,
155 (quoting the UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE
ON INDIAN MATTERS (1975)).
16. See Compelling Interest, supra note 5, at n.86.
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onstrates that United States Attorneys' Offices are meeting their
responsibility to the Native American community.
This article will respond to Jensen and Rosenquist's critique
by establishing that in North Dakota and several other states,' 7 the
United States Attorney is the only prosecutor who can bring felony
cases against those who commit major crimes in Indian country.'
The article will outline the division of Indian country criminal
jurisdiction among the tribes, the states, and the federal govern-
ment. 9 This discussion will note that the federal courts have
exclusive jurisdiction over felony prosecutions of Native Ameri-
cans and non-Native Americans who commit major crimes against
Native American victims in Indian country. 20 The article will then
note that, unlike states, tribes can only bring misdemeanor prose-
cutions.2' Jensen and Rosenquist ignore this important distinction
when they equate prior state and tribal prosecutions. This
response will then demonstrate, contrary to the impression left by
Jensen and Rosenquist's article, that the Department of Justice's
"Petite" policy does not apply to federal prosecutions after tribal
prosecutions.2 2
Finally, the article argues that the United States Attorneys'
Offices should not ignore their important responsibility to Native
American crime victims and communities by failing to prosecute
major crimes simply because a tribal misdemeanor prosecution
arose from the same facts.2 3 The Native American individuals and
communities who become victims of major crimes deserve justice
every bit as much as the victims of crimes committed outside
Indian country. Justice is possible only when the United States
Attorney aggressively prosecutes all of those who commit major
crimes in Indian country, regardless of whether they are or are not
Native American.
17. See infra note 48.
18. See infra notes 36-47 and accompanying text.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 24-53.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 36-53.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 54-66.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 67-93.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 94-125.
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II. FEDERAL COURTS HAVE LIMITED, BUT IMPORTANT,
JURISDICTION OVER MAJOR CRIMES COMMITTED IN
INDIAN COUNTRY
A. OVERVIEW OF JURISDICTION OVER INDIAN COUNTRY
OFFENSES
The United States Code contains special provisions regarding
criminal jurisdiction in "Indian country," which includes all land
within Indian reservations, all dependent Indian communities,
and all unextinguished Indian allotments.24 Jurisdiction over
major crimes in Indian country varies from state to state and, in
some instances, within a given state.25
Prior to 1953, federal courts in all states had jurisdiction over
major crimes committed by Indians in Indian country. 26 Before
the 1953 session of Congress, the Bureau of Indian Affairs con-
sulted several27 tribes for input regarding whether they preferred
that the federal courts retain major crimes jurisdiction, or lose this
jurisdiction in favor of state jurisdiction over all crimes. Some
tribes chose federal jurisdiction, while other tribes chose state
jurisdiction. 28
Congress honored the wishes of the tribes by enacting Public
Law 280 in 1953.29 Public Law 28030 split the responsibility for
prosecution of Indian country major crimes among state prosecu-
tors and United States Attorneys. This statute conferred Indian
country criminal jurisdiction (including jurisdiction over major
24. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
25. For more complete discussions of the complicated and varied jurisdiction over
crimes occurring in Indian country, and the history of this jurisdiction, see UNITED STATES
COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 13 at 137-45; Robert Clinton, Criminal
Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands: A Journey Through a Jurisdictional Maze, 18 ARiz. L. REV.
504 (1976); Peter S. Taylor et al., Development of Tripartite Jurisdiction in Indian Country,
22 KAN. L. REV. 351 (1974); Tim Vollmann, Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country:
Tribal Sovereignty and Defendants' Rights in Conflict, 22 KAN. L. REV. 387 (1974).
26. See infra text accompanying notes 36-47.
27. The enabling acts of the states of Arizona, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, and Washington required the constitutions for these states
to "contain express disclaimers of jurisdiction" over Indian country offenses. See S. REP.
No. 699, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1953), reprinted in 1953 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2409, 2414. Because
jurisdiction could therefore not be ceded to the states by congressional statute alone, the
Bureau of Indian Affairs did not consult the tribes in these states to determine whether they
desired a change to state criminal jurisdiction.
28. See S. REP. No. 699, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1953), reprinted in 1953 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2409, 2413-14.
29. Compare id. with Act of August 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 1953 U.S.C.C.A.N.
(83 Stat.) 663 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162). In the states where some reservations were
excluded from the transfer of jurisdiction from the federal system to the state system, the
tribes from the excluded reservations objected to a transfer of jurisdiction to the state.
30. Act of August 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 1953 U.S.C.C.A.N. (83 Stat.) 663
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162).
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crimes) to certain states, sometimes referred to as "Public Law 280
states."''3 The statute excluded specified Indian reservations in
some of these states from the grant of Indian country jurisdiction
to the states.3 2
In Public Law 280 states or portions of states,33 the state court
system handles cases involving both Native American criminal
defendants and Native American crime victims, just as it handles
cases involving non-Native American criminal defendants and
crime victims. Neither the tribe3 4 nor the federal government35
has the authority to bring felony prosecutions for Indian country
major crimes in these states or portions of states.
The jurisdiction over major crimes in Indian Major Crimes
Act states (also known as "non-Public Law 280 states"), including
North Dakota, follows a different pattern. In these states, and
within the excluded reservations in Public Law 280 states, federal
31. Public Law 280 conferred jurisdiction over all Indian country crimes, including
major crimes, to the states of California and Nebraska. Id. at § 2 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1162 (1988 & Supp. III 1991)). The statute also conferred Indian country criminal
jurisdiction, except for jurisdiction over specified reservations, to other states. See infra
note 32. The 1953 statute conferred Indian country jurisdiction to the state of Wisconsin,
with the exception of the Menominee Reservation. Pub. L. No. 280, 1953 U.S.C.C.A.N. (83
Stat.) 663. Later legislation removed this exception. 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (1988 & Supp. III
1991).
32. Minnesota has Indian country criminal jurisdiction, with the exception of the Red
Lake Indian Reservation. Pub. L. No. 83-280, 1953 U.S.C.C.A.N. (83 Stat.) 663 (codified at
18 U.S.C. § 1162(a)). Oregon has Indian country criminal jurisdiction, with the exception of
the Warm Springs Reservation. Id.
Alaska was not a state when Public Law 280 was enacted in 1953. Later legislation
gave Alaska Indian country criminal jurisdiction, except that on the Annette Islands, the
Metlakatla Indian community retained jurisdiction over offenses committed by Indians. 18
U.S.C. § 1162(a) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
33. Since the passage of Public Law 280 in 1953, several states other than those listed
in 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (the codification of Public Law 280) have assumed criminal jurisdiction
over all or some of the reservations inside their borders. These states include Florida,
Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Utah, and Washington. See Clinton, supra note 25, at 566. Other
states may also have some criminal jurisdiction in Indian country, in addition to the
jurisdiction that all states have over offenses committed by non-Indians against non-Indian
victims. Id. at 568; see infra note 36. For a listing of states having criminal jurisdiction over
Indian country, see Clinton, supra note 25, at 577-83.
States can no longer assume jurisdiction without tribal consent. Federal law has been
changed to require a tribe to consent to a state's assumption of criminal jurisdiction. Id. at
566; infra note 133.
34. The tribes may have retained misdemeanor jurisdiction in Public Law 280 states,
but this is not clear. The statute, later statutes, and legislative history allow for differing
interpretations on this issue. See COHEN, supra note 2, at 344-45. Tribes in Public Law 280
states have been reluctant to assert misdemeanor jurisdiction. See The American Lawyer
Indian Training Program, INDIAN SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE ROLE OF TRIBAL
COURTS at 45 (1977) [hereinafter INDIAN SELF-DETERMINATION].
Even if the tribes maintain misdemeanor jurisdiction in Public Law 280 states,
however, they do not have felony jurisdiction. See infra text accompanying notes 54-66.
35. Public Law 280 withdrew jurisdiction from the federal courts in Public Law 280
states, or the relevant portions of these states, by nullifying §§ 1152 and 1153 of Title 18,
which had previously granted jurisdiction over Indian country offenses to the federal
courts. See 18 U.S.C. § 1162(c) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
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courts have exclusive jurisdiction over felony prosecution of
Indian country major crimes. In Indian Major Crimes Act states or
portions of states, neither state36 nor tribal37 courts have jurisdic-
tion over felony prosecutions for major crimes committed in
Indian country. The remainder of this article will discuss federal
prosecution of major crimes committed in Indian Major Crimes
Act states or portions of states, because Jensen and Rosenquist's
critique is also so limited.
B. FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF MAJOR CRIMES IN INDIAN
MAJOR CRIMES ACT STATES
In Indian Major Crimes Act states, both federal and tribal
courts have jurisdiction over Indian country offenses. Federal and
tribal "personal" jurisdiction do not completely overlap, however.
The United States Attorney is responsible for prosecuting major
offenses committed in Indian country by both Native Americans
and non-Native Americans. The United States Attorney prose-
cutes non-Native Americans for Indian country offenses under the
"Indian Country Crimes Act," section 1152 of Title 18. Tribal
courts do not have jurisdiction over offenses committed by non-
Native Americans. 38
36. Federal jurisdiction over offenses within §§ 1152 and 1153 of Title 18 is exclusive
when an Indian commits the offense. The state courts have no jurisdiction over these
offenses. See, e.g., United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 651 (1978); Seymour v.
Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351, 359 (1962); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 and n.5 (1959);
In re Denetclaw, 320 P.2d 697, 700-01 (Arizona 1958); State v. Campbell, 55 N.W. 553, 555(Minn. 1893); Arquette v. Schneckloth, 351 P.2d 921, 925 (Wash. 1960).
Similarly, non-Public Law 280 states have no jurisdiction over Indian country offenses
committed by non-Indians against Indians, which are prosecuted in federal court under§ 1152 of Title 18. See State v. Flint, 756 P.2d 324, 325 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied,
492 U.S. 911 (1989); State v. Greenwalt, 663 P.2d 1178, 1182-83 (Mont. 1983); State v.
Kuntz, 66 N.W.2d 531, 532 (N.D. 1954); State v. Burnett, 671 P.2d 1165 (Okla. Crim. App.
1983) cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1106 (1986); see also Washington v. Confederated Bands and
Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1979); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S.
217, 220 (1959); Williams v. United States, 327 U.S. 711, 714 (1946); Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae on Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Arizona v. Flint, No. 88-603, at
6, cert. denied, 492 U.S. 911 (1989); Opinion of the Solicitor of the Interior, 5 Indian L. Rep.
H-10 (1978); cf Carter Wood, Crime Falling Through Cracks: Non-Indians Unpunished
Because of Void in jurisdiction, GRAND FORKS HERALD, Oct. 13, 1993, at IA (discussing
absence of state court jurisdiction over misdemeanor offenses committed by non-Indians
against Indians).
The only instance in which an Indian Major Crimes Act state has criminal jurisdiction
over a crime committed in Indian country is when both the defendant and the victim are
non-Indian. See United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 624 (1882); see also Duro V.
Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 680-81 n.1 (1990); Vollmann, supra note 25, at 394-95.
37. Tribal courts have only misdemeanor jurisdiction. See infra text accompanying
notes 54-66.
38. In 1978, the United States Supreme Court held that a tribal court does not have
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191(1978). In 1990, the Supreme Court held that a tribal court does not have criminaljurisdiction over Indians who are members of other tribes. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 688
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Even in Indian Major Crimes Act states, federal criminal juris-
diction over offenses committed by Native Americans is limited to
the most serious crimes. As Jensen and Rosenquist correctly note,
section 1153 of Title 18 is the most important and frequently cited
basis for federal jurisdiction over offenses committed by Native
Americans in Indian country.3 9 This section, the "Indian Major
Crimes Act, ' 4° does not confer general criminal jurisdiction, or
even comprehensive felony jurisdiction, to the federal courts.
Instead, the Indian Major Crimes Act only gives the federal courts
jurisdiction over the following specified major crimes:4' murder,
manslaughter, kidnapping, maiming, rape42 (i.e., aggravated sex-
ual abuse,43 sexual abuse,44 sexual abuse of a minor or ward,45 and
abusive sexual contact 46 ), incest, assault with intent to commit
murder, assault with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in seri-
ous bodily injury, arson, burglary, robbery, and theft. 7
United States Attorneys with jurisdiction over these major
Indian country crimes have an unusual, though not unique,4 8
(1990). In response to the Duro decision, Congress enacted a series of statutes extending
tribal court criminal jurisdiction to all Indians, including non-member Indians. See Act of
November 5, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-511, § 8077, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. (104 Stat.) 1856, 1892-93
(granting tribal court criminal jurisdiction over all Indians until September 30, 1991); Act of
October 9, 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-124, 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. (105 Stat.) 616 (extending tribal
court criminal jurisdiction over all Indians until October 18, 1991); Act of October 28, 1991,
Pub. L. No. 102-137, 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. (105 Stat.) 646 (making the legislative
reinstatement of tribal court criminal jurisdiction permanent).
39. See Compelling Interest, supra note 5, at nn.44-63 and accompanying text. In
practice, prosecutions of Native Americans are rarely based solely on § 1152 of Title 18, the
Indian Country Crimes Act. See Leonard, supra note 2, at 10. As Jensen and Rosenquist
correctly note, the Indian Country Crimes Act contains limitations that render it less
extensive than the Major Crimes Act in these circumstances, including clauses rendering it
ineffective for prosecutions of Indians for crimes against other Indians and for prosecutions
after tribal prosecutions. A leading commentator has stated that the Major Crimes Act
should govern the offenses listed therein, rather than the Indian Country Crimes Act.
COHEN, supra note 2, at 301.
40. See COHEN, supra note 2, at 300-04.
41. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). It is interesting that the list of § 1153
offenses is relegated to a footnote in Jensen and Rosenquist's article, which is an attack of
§ 1153 prosecutions by United States Attorneys (and, more specifically, by the United States
Attorney's Office for the District of North Dakota). See Compelling Interest, supra note 5, at
n.57. Perhaps the authors do not wish to draw their readers' attention to the seriousness of
the crimes within § 1153, since their thesis rests upon the premise that misdemeanor
prosecutions are sufficient for these crimes.
42. In previous codifications, "rape" is listed as a § 1153 offense. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A.§ 1153 (1984). Recent statutes have expanded upon this term, so that § 1153 now confers
federal jurisdiction over the offenses listed in the text. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1153 (Supp. 1993).
43. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1988 & Supp. III 1991); 18 U.S.C. § 2241 (1988).
44. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1988 & Supp. III 1991); 18 U.S.C. § 2242 (1988).
45. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1988 & Supp. III 1991); 18 U.S.C. § 2243 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
46. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1988 & Supp. III 1991); 18 U.S.C. § 2244 (1988).
47. 18 U.S.C. § 661 (1988); 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
48. The United States District Court for the District of North Dakota is not the only
federal court where a United States Attorney regularly brings Indian Major Crimes Act
prosecutions. United States Attorneys have prosecuted Native Americans under § 1153 in
several states that contain Indian country. See, e.g., United States v. Yazzie, 976 F.2d 1252
946
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responsibility. Most United States Attorneys have no general
authority to prosecute those who commit violent crimes, 49 and no
duty to bring such prosecutions. Given the limited criminal juris-
diction of federal courts, state prosecutors are generally responsi-
ble for prosecuting those who commit violent crimes and other
serious felonies. In Indian Major Crimes Act jurisdictions, how-
ever, United States Attorneys have this responsibility for the
crimes listed above, which the United States Commission on Civil
Rights called "the offenses constituting the greatest threat to the
public safety of any community. '5 0 In non-Public Law 280 juris-
dictions, the United States Attorney is, for all practical purposes,
the equivalent of a state or local prosecutor with respect to major
violent crimes.5'
Although the Indian Major Crimes Act gives the federal courts
jurisdiction regardless of whether the Indian criminal's victim was
Indian or non-Indian, this "state and local" prosecutorial responsi-
(9th Cir. 1992) (Arizona); United States v. Blandin, 784 F. 2d 1048 (10th Cir. 1986) (Kansas);
United States v. Bear, 932 F.2d 1279 (9th Cir. 1990) (Idaho); Langley v. Ryder, 778 F.2d
1092 (5th Cir. 1985) (Louisiana); United States v. Levesque, 681 F.2d 75 (1st Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1089 (1982) (Maine); Cardinal v. United States, 954 F.2d 359 (6th Cir.
1992) (Michigan); United States v. Sayers, 919 F.2d 1321 (8th Cir. 1990) (Minnesota); United
States v. Garfield, 987 F.2d 1424 (9th Cir. 1993) (Montana); United States v. Burns, 701 F.2d
840 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 462 U.S. 1137 (1983) (Nevada); United States v. Talamante, 981
F.2d 1153 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1876 (1993) (New Mexico); United States
v. Markiewicz, 978 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1065 (1993) (New York);
United States v. Walkingeagle, 974 F.2d 551 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1818
(1993) (North Carolina); United States v. Lester, 992 F.2d 174 (8th Cir. 1993) (North
Dakota); United States v. Sands, 968 F.2d 1058 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 987
(1993) (Oklahoma); United States v. Tootick, 952 F.2d 1078 (9th Cir. 1991) (Oregon); United
States v. Whitted, 994 F.2d 444 (8th Cir. 1993) (South Dakota); United States v. Farley, 992
F.2d 1122 (10th Cir. 1993) (Utah); United States v. Fulton, 987 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1993)
(Washington); Olson v. United States, 989 F.2d 229 (7th Cir. 1993) (Wisconsin); and United
States v. Lonedog, 929 F.2d 568 (10th Cir.) cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 164 (1991) (Wyoming).
49. In limited circumstances where a federal nexus has been established by statute, a
United States Attorney can prosecute defendants for violent crimes. Examples of federal
crimes of violence include assaulting a federal officer, kidnapping (but only when the victim
is transported in interstate or foreign commerce or is a protected foreign officer or federal
official, or the kidnapping is within the special aircraft, maritime, or territorial jurisdiction
of the United States), and carjacking of a vehicle that has been transported, shipped, or
received in interstate or foreign commerce. 18 U.S.C. §§ 111; 1114 (1988 & Supp. 1II 1991);
§ 1201 (1988 & Supp. III 1991); 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (Supp. 1993). In each of these instances,
the United States Attorney must establish the presence of this nexus as an element of the
crime. Outside of Indian country, however, the federal courts do not have general
jurisdiction over major violent crimes.
50. UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 13, at 144.
51. See id. at 146 (stating that United States Attorneys "must function as local
prosecutors for Indian reservations") and 155 (citing UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON INDIAN MATTERS, at 45 (1975)).
The United States Attorney's responsibility to prosecute major crimes is a serious one.
Unfortunately, crime is a reality of life in Indian country, just as it is a reality outside of
Indian country. For example, the victim-witness staff in the United States Attorney's Office
for the District of Arizona, an Indian Major Crimes Act state, had more than 4,000 contacts
with victims and witnesses of crimes on Arizona's seventeen reservations in 1988. Linda A.
Akers, Prosecutor's Role Difficult One, THE MARICOPA LAWYER Sept. 1989, at 6.
948 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:939
bility extends primarily to Indian victims.52 The victims of major
crimes in Indian country are almost invariably Native American.
5 3
III. TRIBAL COURT MISDEMEANOR PROSECUTIONS ARE
NOT EQUIVALENT TO STATE AND FEDERAL
FELONY PROSECUTIONS
In their criticism of the United States Attorney's Office for the
District of North Dakota for prosecuting Native Americans who
commit major crimes in Indian country, Jensen and Rosenquist
make passing reference to the differences between state and fed-
eral sovereignty and criminal jurisdiction and tribal sovereignty
and criminal jurisdiction.5 a By overemphasizing the importance
of tribal prosecutions, however, the authors demonstrate a lack of
understanding of the critical importance of the limited sover-
eignty and criminal jurisdiction of the tribes.
As the authors recognize,5 5 the federal government and the
government of each of the states have separate sovereignty and
full power to punish those who commit crimes within their bor-
ders.56 The federal government and the governments of each of
the states can sentence a convicted criminal defendant to any
term of years in prison, to life imprisonment,5 and even to
death. 8 In other words, the governments of the United States and
52. The Civil Rights Commission found: "With the extensive scope of Federal
jurisdiction over criminal offenses in Indian country and the stringent limitations placed on
tribal jurisdiction, it is evident that an effective Federal law enforcement effort is essential
to the well-being and safety of Indian communities." UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON
CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 13, at 145.
53. To the best of this author's knowledge and memory, every victim of a crime
prosecuted under the Indian Major Crimes Act during the author's three year tenure as
United States Attorney was Native American, with the exception of a few (but a small
minority of) burglary victims. The Assistant United States Attorneys for the District of
North Dakota confirm that almost all victims of Indian Major Crimes Act offenses in North
Dakota have been Native American.
Cf. JUSTICE AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN, supra note 14, at Appendix C (basing
victimization rate study upon the assumption that victims of violent crime are Native
American); UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 13, at 151 (quoting
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF TASK FORCE ON INDIAN MATTERS,
at 42-43, n.45).
54. See Compelling Interest, supra note 5, at nn.14, 55, 92 & 95, and accompanying
texts.
55. See id. at nn.37-38 and accompanying text.
56. The United States and the states also have the power to prosecute any person who
commits a crime within their territorial jurisdiction. See CHARLES E. TORCIA, I
WHARTON'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 15 (1989); CHARLES E. TORCIA, I WHARTON'S
CRIMINAL LAW § 14 (1978 & Supp. 1992).
57. In affirming a Michigan life sentence for possession of 672 grams of cocaine, the
Supreme Court held that the length of the sentence for a state felony is a matter of
legislative prerogative. Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2684 (1991).
58. See CHARLES E. TORCIA, II WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 150 (1979 & Supp.
1992).
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each of the states have full felony 59 criminal jurisdiction.
The sovereignty of Indian tribes is far more limited than the
sovereignty of the United States and the states. Indian tribes are
"quasi-sovereign," not fully sovereign."° The criminal jurisdiction
of Indian tribes is also far more limited than the criminal jurisdic-
tion of the federal and state governments. Unlike the United
States and the states, tribes cannot prosecute all persons who com-
mit crimes within their geographical jurisdiction. A tribe can only
prosecute Indian defendants.6 ' In addition, the tribes can sen-
tence offenders to no more than one year in prison.6 ' Therefore,
tribes have only misdemeanor63 jurisdiction, not felony jurisdic-
tion. Regardless of the heinousness of an offense, a tribal prosecu-
tor cannot bring a felony prosecution.
The difference between the tribes' extremely limited power
to punish serious criminal offenses with only a one year prison
term and the unlimited punitive power of the state and federal
governments must be taken into account when comparing a prior
prosecution by a tribe to a prior prosecution by a state or the
United States. A prior prosecution that resulted in a misdemeanor
conviction and a sentence no higher than one year is simply not
equivalent to a prior felony conviction that resulted, or could have
resulted, in a lengthy prison term. 4 Jensen and Rosenquist's
59. A felony is a crime punishable by more than one year of imprisonment. CHARLES
E. ToRCIA, I WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 19 (1978 & Supp. 1992).
60. See Compelling Interest, supra note 5, at nn.39-40 and accompanying text. The
federal government has a trust responsibility to Indians and Indian tribes. See COHEN,
supra note 2, at 220-28. The Supreme Court has stated, "The sovereignty that the Indian
tribes retain is of a unique and limited character." United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313,
323 (1978).
In Duro v. Reina, the Supreme Court discussed the limited sovereignty of tribes:
A basic attribute of full territorial sovereignty is the power to enforce laws
against all who come within the sovereign's territory, whether citizens or aliens.
Oliphant recognized that the tribes can no longer be described as sovereigns in
this sense. Rather, as our discussion in Wheeler reveals, the retained sovereignty
of the tribes is that needed to control their own internal relations, and to
preserve their own unique customs and social order. The power of a tribe to
prescribe and enforce rules of conduct for its own members "does not fall within
that part of sovereignty which the Indians implicitly lost by virtue of their
dependent status. The areas in which such implicit divestiture of sovereignty
has been held to have occurred are those involving the relations between an
Indian tribe and nonmembers of the tribe."
495 U.S. 676, 685-86 (1990) (citation omitted).
61. See supra note 38.
62. See 25 U.S.C. 1302(7) (1988). Prior to 1986, the maximum tribal sentence was six
months of imprisonment. See id. (amendments). Some tribal codes may still call for
maximum sentences of six months. See, e.g., CRIMINAL CODE OF THE THREE AFFILIATED
TRIBES OF THE FORT BERTHOLD RESERVATION § 110.4.
63. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 681 (1990). A misdemeanor is a crime punishable
by up to one year of imprisonment. CHARLES E. TORCIA, I WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW,
§ 20 (1978 & Supp. 1992).
64. The courts have long recognized the difference between a misdemeanor and a
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entire analysis, including their subjective observations and the
results of their "informal survey,"65 ignores this difference and is,
therefore, fundamentally flawed. 6
IV. THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE'S PETITE POLICY
DOES NOT APPLY WHEN THE PRIOR PROSECUTION
WAS IN TRIBAL COURT
Jensen and Rosenquist recognize that the Constitution's
double jeopardy clause does not bar a federal major crime prose-
cution following a tribal misdemeanor prosecution, because the
federal and tribal governments are separate sovereigns.6 7 How-
ever, the authors give inordinate attention to the Department of
Justice's Petite6" policy, which requires a United States Attorney to
felony prosecution. Police officers are allowed to make warrantless arrests upon reasonable
ground to believe that a misdemeanor was committed, but they cannot make warrantless
arrests for felonies under these circumstances. See CHARLES E. TORCIA, I WHARTON'S
CRIMINAL LAW § 21 (1978 & Supp. 1992). A greater number of peremptory challenges is
given in felony trials. Id. The defendant must be present at a felony trial, but not at a
misdemeanor trial. Id. In many jurisdictions, an individual convicted of a felony loses
certain rights that are retained by an individual convicted of a misdemeanor, such as the
right to vote, the right to serve as a juror, and the right to hold public office. Id. Similarly,
the constitutional right to a jury trial applies to "serious" offenses, but not to "petty"
offenses. See DAVID A. RUDSTEIN ET AL., 3 CRIMINAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.02
(1992).
The courts have also recognized the critical distinction between a prosecution for a
minor offense and a felony prosecution in the precise context at issue in Compelling
Interest, supra note 5, and this response (i.e., the effect of a prior minor crime prosecution
upon a later felony prosecution). In a case cited by Jensen and Rosenquist, see id. at n.35,
the United States Supreme Court rejected a criminal defendant's argument that a prior
prosecution barred a .subsequent prosecution by a different sovereign, noting that
"[p]rosecution by one sovereign for a relatively minor offense might bar prosecution by the
other for a much graver one, thus effectively depriving the latter of the right to enforce its
own laws." United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 318 (1978).
Even Jensen and Rosenquist acknowledge the limited significance of a prior
misdemeanor prosecution, as opposed to a prior felony prosecution. See Compelling
Interest, supra note 5, at text accompanying nn.54-55. ("[An] exemption from prosecution
of individuals who had previously been punished by the tribal authorities ha[s] the potential
for great injustice. For example, an individual could avoid federal prosecution of a serious
crime by simply submitting to the tribal authorities and subjecting herself/himself to the
penalties imposed for a lesser offense.").
65. See id. at text preceding n.95.
66. This fundamental flaw in Jensen and Rosenquist's analysis mars their analogy to the
trials of the officers accused of beating Rodney King. See id. at nn.10- 11 and accompanying
text. These officers faced the risk of felony convictions and significant prison sentences
when the State of California prosecuted them. Nonetheless, the federal government's right
to prosecute them for violations of the United States Code was unaffected by this previous
state felony prosecution.
If the federal government retains the right to prosecute after a felony state
prosecution, its right and duty to prosecute for a major crime should be even less affected
by a tribal misdemeanor prosecution.
67. See Compelling Interest, supra note 5, at nn.25-63, accompanying text, and cases
and authorities cited therein.
68. The Department of Justice's Petite policy, which is named after Petite v. United
States, 361 U.S. 529 (1960), is found in the UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-2.142
[hereinafter USAM].
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obtain the approval of an Assistant Attorney General prior to initi-
ating a federal prosecution after a previous state or federal prose-
cution.6 9 Jensen and Rosenquist begrudgingly acknowledge that
the Department of Justice's internal Petite policy creates no rights
that are enforceable by a criminal defendant in court.7 0 Curiously,
though, they give far more attention to an isolated, summarily
reversed,71 case in which a district court ignored this clearly set-
tled doctrine7 2 than to the overwhelming line of cases that estab-
lish that the Petite policy cannot be enforced by a criminal
defendant.73
The authors commit a basic and glaring error in their lengthy
discussion of the Petite policy and their suggestion that Indian
Major Crimes Act prosecutions somehow violate this policy. 74 The
error is simple: The Petite policy does not apply to federal prose-
cutions that follow tribal prosecutions.
The Petite policy limits federal prosecutions following previ-
ous state or federal prosecutions. The policy explicitly refers only
to prior state or federal prosecutions and makes no reference
whatsoever to prior tribal prosecutions.75 Similarly, the materials
cited by Jensen and Rosenquist universally make reference to
prior state or federal prosecutions, and none of them refer to prior
tribal prosecutions.7 6
69. USAM § 9-2.142(AX1) ("The policy applies and authorization must be obtained
from the appropriate Assistant Attorney General whenever there has been a prior state
proceeding or a prior federal prosecution ....") (emphasis added).
70. See Compelling Interest, supra note 5, at nn.80-102 and accompanying text. The
United States Courts of Appeals have unanimously and repeatedly held that the courts
cannot "enforce" the Department of Justice's Petite policy. See, e.g., United States v.
Lester, 992 F.2d 174, 176-77 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Simpkins, 953 F.2d 443, 445
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1988 (1992); United States v. Haren, 952 F.2d 190, 198 (8th
Cir. 1991); United States v. Woodard, 927 F. 2d 433, 435 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
246 (1991); United States v. Bartlett, 856 F.2d 1071, 1075 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Ng, 699 F.2d 63, 71 (2d Cir. 1983).
71. Lester, 992 F.2d at 174. The Eighth Circuit devoted only three paragraphs of its
opinion to its reversal of the district court. Id. at 176-77.
72. See Compelling Interest, supra note 5, at nn.136-146 and accompanying text.
73. See supra note 70 for cases cited. The Eighth Circuit has articulated the rationale
for the courts' lack of jurisdiction to interpret or enforce the Department of Justice's Petite.
policy:
In short, the Attorney General has announced a policy for the internal operation
of the Justice Department. He is free to change that policy at any time and is
free to enforce it as he sees fit. To further complicate criminal litigation by
involving the courts in this activity would be unwise and would have an adverse
effect on the administration of criminal justice.
Delay v. United States, 602 F.2d 173, 179 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1012 (1980); see
also United States v. Mitchell, 778 F.2d 1271, 1276-77 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Wal-
lace, 578 F.2d 735, 740 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, Mitchell v. United States, 439 U.S. 898 (1978).
74. See Compelling Interest, supra note 5, at nn.64-102, 136-146 and accompanying
texts.
75. See supra note 69; USAM § 9-2.142.
76. See Compelling Interest, supra note 5, at n.66 (quoting Attorney General Rogers'
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The Department of Justice's policy regarding federal prosecu-
tions after tribal prosecutions is set out in a section of the United
States Attorneys' Manual77 that is entirely separate from the por-
tion of the manual outlining the Petite policy. This Department of
Justice policy, unlike the Petite policy, does not require a United
States Attorney to acquire approval for a federal prosecution fol-
lowing a tribal prosecution. 78  Therefore, in Major Crime Act
cases, the United States Attorney is free, as he or she is in most
other cases, to prosecute if he or she believes substantial federal
interests are at stake. 79
press release announcing the Petite policy), text accompanying n.70 (quoting Attorney
General Rogers), and n.78 (quoting UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL).
77. USAM § 9-20.212.
78. Id.; see also UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 13, at 146
("Primary responsibility for criminal prosecutions rests with individual United States
attorneys whose districts contain Indian country, and their exercise of discretion is not
limited or monitored to any great degree within Department of Justice headquarters.").
79. USAM § 9-20.212.
Jensen and Rosenquist state that they "respectfully disagree" with the author of this
response regarding the inapplicability of the Petite policy to federal prosecutions after tribal
prosecutions. See Compelling Interest, supra note 5, at n.62. This is not a matter for
academic disagreement among authors. Rather, it is simply an issue of what the internal
Department of Justice policy is, and there is no basis for disputing this matter.
Despite their lengthy review of the Petite policy, law review articles analyzing the
Petite policy, court decisions discussing the Petite policy, and even the news releases of the
Attorney General who implemented the Petite policy, see id. at nn.64-102 and
accompanying text, the authors are not able to cite a single document supporting their
incorrect conclusion that the Petite policy applies when the prior prosecution was in tribal
court. The reason is simple: no such document exists. The authors are incorrect in
concluding that the Petite policy applies in these circumstances.
In an attempt to salvage their incorrect conclusion, the authors suggest that the
absence of a statement that the Petite policy is inapplicable in the Eighth Circuit's opinion
in United States v. Lester, 992 F.2d 174 (8th Cir. 1993), somehow suggests that the policy is
applicable. See Compelling Interest, supra note 5, at n.62. This curious reading of the
Lester case ignores the obvious fact that the Eighth Circuit held that it did not have the
power to enforce the Petite policy in any event, see supra notes 70-71, and the court
therefore never reached the issue of whether the policy applied to the case at hand.
The conclusion that Jensen and Rosenquist draw from this court opinion also belies
their own admission that the courts have concluded that only the Department of Justice,
and not the courts, can interpret and enforce the Department's internal Petite policy. See
Compelling Interest, supra note 5, at n.82 and nn.96-102 and accompanying text.
Within the Department of Justice, there is no dispute: Department officials know that
the Petite policy, which makes no reference whatsoever to federal prosecutions after tribal
prosecutions, see supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text, does not apply to these cases.
As a former Department of Justice official, the author of this response was required to know
and follow Department policy. The author and his fellow United States Attorneys in
judicial districts that included Indian country never sought prior Deputy Attorney General
Petite policy approval before initiating Indian Major Crimes Act prosecutions after tribal
prosecutions, because the Department of Justice has always taken the position that the
Petite policy does not apply to these cases. It would be irresponsible for the Department of
Justice to adopt a policy requiring Deputy Attorney General approval prior to Indian Major
Crimes Act prosecutions. The United States Attorneys' offices in at least eighteen states
have the responsibility to prosecute Indian Major Crimes Act offenses. See supra note 48.
At least hundreds, and probably thousands, of Indian Major Crimes Act prosecutions occur
every year, cf. note 51 supra (noting that the United States Attorney's Office for the District
of Arizona has over 4,000 contacts with Indian country crime victims and witnesses every
year), and many of these cases occur after tribal prosecutions. Pre-indictment review of
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The Department of Justice has created different policies for
federal prosecutions following tribal prosecutions, as opposed to
state or federal prosecutions, because these two situations present
very different circumstances. A previous tribal prosecution could
only have been for a misdemeanor, s° even though the contem-
plated federal prosecution is for a violation of the Indian Major
Crimes Act. A previous state or federal prosecution, on the other
hand, was a prosecution by a sovereign government with full fel-
ony criminal jurisdiction."'
The Petite policy recognizes the fundamental difference
between a federal prosecution following a misdemeanor prosecu-
tion and a federal prosecution following a felony prosecution.
Under the Petite policy, the necessary pre-charging approval is not
to be given "unless the state/prior federal proceeding left substan-
tial federal interests demonstrably unvindicated."8 2  In cases
where the policy applies, this substantial federal interest require-
ment is met when a prior state or federal prosecution resulted in a
misdemeanor conviction and a subsequent federal felony convic-
tion is anticipated. 3 Therefore, even if the Petite policy did apply
to Indian Major Crimes Act prosecutions following tribal misde-
meanor prosecutions, these felony prosecutions would meet the
substantial federal interest requirement.
Because the Petite policy does not apply to federal Major
Crimes prosecutions after tribal prosecutions, much of Jensen and
Rosenquist's criticism, including their complaints of "erratic and
unpredictable" application of the policy,84 is irrelevant. There is
nothing erratic or unpredictable about the application of the Petite
policy to Indian Major Crimes prosecutions after tribal prosecu-
tions: The policy does not apply, and it is not applied, to these
prosecutions.
The authors express surprise that their survey of North
Dakota criminal defense attorneys "indicated that very few, if any,
instances existed where a federal (Indian country) prosecution was
dismissed pursuant to the Petite policy."8 5 This finding is wholly
predictable. A case should never be dismissed pursuant to a policy
that is inapplicable to that case. Similarly, it is neither "alarm-
each of these cases by a Deputy Attorney General from Washington, D.C., would result in a
tremendous waste of the Department of Justice's limited resources.
80. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
82. USAM 9-2.142(AX3).
83. Id. at n.9
84. See Compelling Interest, supra note 5, at text accompanying n.80.
85. Id. at text preceding n.95.
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ing"8 6 nor even particularly "interesting"' 7 that forty defense
attorneys responding to the authors' survey have experienced fed-
eral prosecution following tribal misdemeanor prosecutions, while
only one defense attorney has experienced a federal prosecution
following a state prosecution. Federal Indian Major Crimes Act
prosecutions are required necessary following tribal misdemeanor
prosecutions, because the minimal tribal proceedings leave the
substantial federal interest in prosecuting major crimes unvindi-
cated. Also, Assistant Attorney General approval is not required in
these cases, but it is required prior to a federal prosecution follow-
ing a previous state or federal prosecution.
In addition, tribal and federal jurisdiction overlap significantly
in Indian Major Crimes Act cases."" In contrast, federal and state
criminal jurisdiction overlap in very few areas, particularly with
regard to violent crime. 9 State prosecutors have the fundamental
responsibility to prosecute violent and other major crimes that
occur outside Indian country. The United States Attorney and the
tribal prosecutors both have this responsibility in Indian country,
though the United States Attorney has felony prosecution author-
ity and the tribal prosecutor has misdemeanor authority. Because
the United States Attorney's violent crime responsibility overlaps
with the tribal prosecutors' violent crime responsibility, but not
86. Id. at text following n.146.
87. Id. at text preceding n.95.
88. The crimes set out in the Major Crimes Act are egregious offenses. It is reasonable
to assume that most behavior that violates the Major Crimes Act also violates most tribal
codes. The Devils Lake Sioux Law and Order Code, for example, outlaws abduction,
assault, assault and battery, false arrest, fornication, theft, trespass, assault with intent to
commit rape, carnal knowledge of a female under sixteen, and forcible entry or detainer of
lands, buildings, or possessions. DEVILS LAKE Sioux TRIBAL CODE §§ 3-7-101; -103; -104;
-121; -122; -140; -141; -143; -144; -158. Similarly, the Criminal Code of the Three Affiliated
Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation prohibits simple assault, recklessly endangering
another person, assault and battery, false imprisonment, corruption of minors and
seduction, sexual assault, risking catastrophe (including reckless employment of fire),
criminal trespass, theft by extortion, and incest. CRIMINAL CODE OF THE THREE
AFFILIATED TRIBES OF THE FORT BERTHOLD RESERVATION §§ 220.1; 220.2; 220.3; 230.2;
240.2; 240.3; 310.3; 320.1; 330.4; 410.3.
89. See supra note 49.
The major area of overlap, as a practical matter, between state and federal criminal
jurisdiction concerns narcotics offenses. During the author's three year tenure as United
States Attorney, the only request for Petite policy prosecution authorization issued by the
North Dakota United States Attorney's Office involved a narcotics trafficking offense. In
that case, the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed a state court drug trafficking
conviction, holding that the reverse sting employed by law enforcement officers constituted
"per se" entrapment. State v. Kummer, 481 N.W.2d 437 (N.D. 1992). Following receipt of
Assistant Attorney General Petite policy approval, the United States Attorney's Office
sought an indictment. Following indictment, the defendant pleaded guilty, preserving his
entrapment argument for appeal. Judgment, United States v. Kummer, C3-92-67-01 (D.
N.D. 1993). The defendant's appeal is pending. United States v. Kummer, No. 93-
1904NDF (8th Cir.).
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with the state prosecutors' violent crime responsibility, the "forty
to one" survey results are not surprising.
The overlap between tribal and federal prosecution is not
complete, however. Because Jensen and Rosenquist's article
focuses on cases where a defendant is prosecuted by both the tribe
and the United States, a reader may have the mistaken impression
that all tribal prosecutions are followed by federal prosecutions,
and that all federal prosecutions are preceded by tribal prosecu-
tions. This is not the case. Many acts that violate tribal criminal
codes do not violate the Indian Major Crimes Act.90 In some cases
where an act violates both a tribal code and the Indian Major
Crimes Act, the case is not referred to the United States Attorney's
Office for prosecution.91 In some cases that are referred, the
United States Attorney declines prosecution. 92 In still other cases,
the United States Attorney prosecutes the defendant, but the tri-
bal prosecutor declines prosecution.9 3 Jensen and Rosenquist's
survey would have been more complete and more informative if it
had asked attorneys how often they had represented Native Amer-
ican defendants in tribal cases that were not followed by federal
prosecution.
V. UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' OFFICES SHOULD NOT
IGNORE THEIR OBLIGATION TO PROSECUTE MAJOR
CRIMES IN INDIAN COUNTRY
United States Attorneys' Offices are responsible for enforcing
many federal criminal statutes, but the responsibility of the Offices
90. For example, the Turtle Mountain Tribal Code outlaws adultery, bastardy, bigamy,
cruelty to animals, cutting green timber without a permit, drawing or uttering an
instrument on a bank without funds or credit, failure to support dependent persons and
abandonment, failure to send children to school, gambling, shining, littering public waters,
parks, and roadways, misbranding, and numerous other offenses that do not constitute
violations of the Indian Major Crimes Act. See TURTLE MOUNTAIN TRIBAL CODE OF 1976
Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians §§ 1.2002; 1.2006; 1.2007; 1.2013; 1.2016;
1.2020; 1.2024; 1.2025; 1.2031; 1.2033; 1.2038; 1.2042.
91. For a discussion of the difficulties sometimes encountered in the referral of Indian
country cases to the United States Attorney's Office, see JUSTICE AND THE AMERICAN
INDIAN, supra note 14, at 12-14.
92. See UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 13, at 154-56. In
some cases where a less serious violation of the Indian Major Crimes Act has been alleged,
the United States Attorney's Office may decline prosecution if the defendant has been
convicted and significantly punished in tribal court. See infra note 105.
93. Some tribes have been reluctant to exercise jurisdiction over Indian Major Crimes
Act offenses that also violate tribal codes. See INDIAN SELF-DETERMINATION, supra note
34, at 43 ("Although the law is not settled, it has been argued that these 14 major crimes
remain subject to concurrent tribal jurisdiction, and a few tribes actually exercise such
authority."). Some commentators have even argued that the tribes do not have jurisdiction
over Indian Major Crimes Act offenses. See Vollmann, supra note 25, at 390 ("The [Indian
Major Crimes] Act has been generally interpreted as eliminating tribal jurisdiction over the
major crimes, though not much authority exists for that proposition.") (footnotes omitted).
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in non-Public Law 280 states for enforcing the Indian Major
Crimes Act should be among the top priorities of these Offices. In
most of the other federal crimes prosecuted by United States
Attorneys' Offices, society, rather than an individual, is the victim
of the crime.94 In almost 95 every Indian Major Crimes Act case,
there is a living (or dead) human being who is a crime victim.9"
Because each Indian Major Crimes Act case also represents signifi-
cant lawlessness, the Native American community is also a societal
victim.
A. MAJOR CRIMES REQUIRE FELONY PROSECUTION
When an Indian Major Crimes Act offense has occurred, the
interests of the Native American community and the individual
Native American victim in justice is not served by a mere misde-
meanor prosecution. In the more heinous crimes covered by the
Indian Major Crimes Act, only a felony conviction with the possi-
bility of a significant prison sentence serves the often stated pur-
poses of criminal prosecution and punishment:97 deterrence,98
incapacitation,9 9 just punishment,' 00 and rehabilitation.'0 1 Misde-
94. For example, United States Attorneys' Offices prosecute narcotics trafficking
offenses, violations of federal firearms statutes, tax fraud, and government program fraud.
95. In some burglary and arson cases, the victim will be a business, association, or other
entity, rather than an individual.
96. See supra text accompanying notes 41-47 for offenses enumerated in 18 U.S.C.
§ 1153.
97. See, e.g., United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, § 1A.2 (Nov.,
1992) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.].
98. The deterrent effect of only a misdemeanor prosecution of murder, manslaughter,
rape, other sexual abuse, and the potentially profitable crimes of arson, robbery, and
burglary would be minimal.
The United States Commission on Civil Rights has noted that the "jurisdictional
restrictions" on tribal courts render them incapable of effectively managing the crime
problem presented by major crimes. UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra
note 13, at 146. The Commission noted that "there is no effective alternative to Federal
prosecution of major crimes." Id. at 150 (citing April 11, 1979, letter by Michael D.
Hawkins, United States Attorney for the District of Arizona). According to the Commission,
lack of federal prosecution of major crimes encourages antisocial behavior. Id. at 155.
The National American Indian Court Judges Association reached a similar conclusion
when it studied federal prosecution of Major Crimes Act offenses: "A guilty defendant
whose case is not accepted for federal prosecution feels he has gotten away with something.
In close-knit communities such as Indian reservations, this can easily foster further
antisocial behavior." JUSTICE AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN, supra note 14, at 28.
99. U.S.S.G. § 1A.2. A simple example will demonstrate the ineffectiveness of
misdemeanor prosecutions in incapacitating serious offenders. Assume that a Native
American community is terrorized by a serial murderer, rapist, or child sexual abuser. If
the punishment of a person who is prepared to commit his or her crime over and over is
limited to one year for each offense, the community can expect to be revictimized every
year.
100. Id. Political philosophers have long recognized that the criminal justice system is
founded upon the crime victim's desire and need for revenge. In a civilized society, victims
of serious crimes are not allowed to seek their own revenge against the criminals who
harmed them. By virtue of the social contract regarding criminal justice, the crime victim
can only look to society to achieve this redress. Society has an obligation, therefore, to
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meanor prosecutions do not meet these goals when a serious crime
has been committed.
B. NATIVE AMERICAN CRIME VICTIMS DESERVE JUSTICE
Jensen and Rosenquist condemn the North Dakota United
States Attorney's Office policy of prosecuting provable major
crimes offenses without regard to the perpetrator's race. 10 2 With-
out any support whatsoever, they state that this policy results in
"needless prosecutions on the basis of race. "103
Jensen and Rosenquist should be more circumspect in their
unfounded accusations of racism, for their proposed policy of fed-
eral nonprosecution of Indian country major crimes would undeni-
ably be racist. The authors do not, and surely would not, suggest
that a state prosecutor who attempts only misdemeanor prosecu-
tion of a provable case of murder, manslaughter, rape, child sexual
abuse, or felony burglary has met his or her responsibility to soci-
achieve retribution for criminal offenses through just punishment. See ROBERT C.
SOLOMON, A PASSION FOR JUSTICE: EMOTIONS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE SOCIAL
CONTRACT (1990). As one commentator has noted, "[Ilf punishment no longer satisfies the
desire for vengeance, if it ignores not only the rights but the emotional needs of the victims
of crime, then punishment no longer serves its primary purpose, even if it succeeds in
rehabilitating the criminal and deterring other crime ...." Id. at 275.
Society satisfies its end of this social conduct only when the punishment is significant
enough to "fit" the crime. Immanuel Kant has opined: ''[O]nly the law of retribution (jus
talionis) can determine exactly the kind and degree of punishment.'" Id. at 281 (quoting
Immanuel Kant's PHILOSOPHY OF LAW). As the President's Task Force on Victims of
Crime noted, "[T]he sentence is a barometer of the seriousness with which the criminal
conduct is viewed." FINAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 76. Given current societal measures
of the seriousness of these offenses when committed outside of Indian country, prison
sentences of only one year for major crimes such as murder, rape, and child abuse are too
minimal to be called just punishment. See JUSTICE AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN, supra note
14, at 43 (stating that declination of federal prosecution "fosters ... a communal anger
when residents see an individual set free without having been punished for his crime");
UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 13, at 155 (reporting that the
then six-month maximum tribal court sentence "is often an inadequate sanction for the
seriousness of the offense").
101. U.S.S.G. § 1A.2. Effective prison treatment programs often require more than
one year of imprisonment. For example, professionals who treat incest perpetrators believe
that effective treatment cannot take place in less than two to five years. ANNE'TE PLYER
ET AL., Current Treatment Providers, in THE INCEST PERPETRATOR: A FAMILY MEMBER
No ONE WANTS TO TREAT 214 (Anne L. Horton, ed., Sage Publications, Inc. 1988).
102. The United States Attorney's Office for the District of North Dakota primarily
prosecutes Native Americans who commit major crimes under § 1153 of Title 18. See supra
notes 39-47 and accompanying text. The Office prosecutes non-Native Americans who
commit major offenses in Indian country under § 1152 of Title 18. See supra text
accompanying note 38.
Federal sentences are controlled by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 28 U.S.C.
§ 994 (1988 & Supp. III 1991); see U.S.S.G. § 1A.1. Therefore, the statute that provides the
basis for federal jurisdiction does not effect the sentence received by a defendant convicted
of an Indian country major crime.
103. Compelling Interest, supra note 5, at text following n.146. The authors also
suggest that the United States Attorney's Office prosecutes offenses "with 'an evil eye and
an unequal hand.'" Id. at text following n.146 (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,
373-74 (1886)).
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ety and to the crime victim. A state prosecutor who withheld fel-
ony prosecution in favor of only misdemeanor prosecution of a
provable major offense would be derelict in his or her duty and
would be subject to dismissal at the next election.
By proposing that the United States Attorney should forego
federal felony prosecution of Indian Major Crimes Act offenses,
Jensen and Rosenquist imply that the Native American commu-
nity and the Native American crime victim, unlike the non-Native
American community and the non-Native American victim,
should be satisfied with mere misdemeanor prosecution. 10 4 This
suggestion is reprehensible. A Native American murder or man-
slaughter victim's life is worth no less than the life of a non-Native
American. A Native American rape victim's dignity and pain are
worth no less than the dignity and pain of a non-Native American.
The psyche and body of a Native American child who is sexually
abused are just as delicate and worthy of societal protection as the
psyche and body on a non-Native American child. The home and
property of a Native American burglary victim 5 deserve the
same protection as the home and property of a non-Native
104. As one group that studied federal prosecution of major crimes in Indian country
has concluded, "Declination, particularly on a technicality, is painful to community
members, especially if the offense was a violent crime or a crime against the community
itself .... This anger and frustration often leads to dissatisfaction with the entire law and
order system." JUSTICE AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN, supra note 14, at 43-44.
105. Jensen and Rosenquist protest the burglary prosecution in United States v. Azure,
No. C2-92-40-01 (D. N.D. 1992). Compelling Interest, supra note 5, at nn.87-89 and
accompanying text. The authors fail to mention that the crime was serious: the defendant
pleaded guilty to burglarizing a home and stealing property worth almost $1,000. See
Judgment, United States v. Azure, at 5 (ordering restitution of $942). Similarly, the authors'
critique of the federal prosecution in United States v. J.A.L., J2-91-88-02 (D. N.D. 1992), see
Compelling Interest, supra note 5, at nn.90-91, suggests that the authors believe the crime
of automobile theft is not serious, despite the fact that it is a felony within the Indian Major
Crimes Act.
The authors belittle these cases as prosecutions of "juveniles and petty thieves." See id.
at n.94. The authors' characterization of a burglar who invades a home and steals almost
$1,000 of property as a petty thief is questionable. Crime victims who have their homes
invaded (or their automobiles stolen and damaged) rarely consider these intrusions
insignificant. Furthermore, juveniles often commit serious crimes. For example, a juvenile
in a recent North Dakota Indian country prosecution brutally murdered an elderly woman
in her home. See Boy arrested in stabbing death, THE FORUM, August 11, 1992, at A7; Teen
held in stabbing death of Fort Totten woman, GRAND FORKS HERALD, August 11, 1992, at
B1.
The authors imply that the United States Attorney's Office's recommendations of
sentences of probation in Azure and].A.L., somehow suggest that the Office should not have
prosecuted the offenses. See Compelling Interest, supra note 5, at nn.89, 91 and
accompanying texts. Under the standard plea agreement policy of the United States
Attorney's Office for the District of North Dakota (which is controlled by the Department of
Justice's policies regarding charging and plea agreements), the Office no longer engages in
plea bargaining. Instead, the Office offers each criminal defendant a standard plea
agreement, which requires the defendant to plead to offenses that maximize his sentence
under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines or applicable minimum mandatory sentence
statutes, in exchange for the Office's recommendation of a sentence within the Guideline
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American. 106
range. Except in unusual circumstances, if the defendant refuses to plead to sentence
maximizing offenses, the case is tried.
The United States Attorney's Office can stand on its record regarding sentencing
advocacy. The numerous appeals of sentencing decisions by the United States Attorney's
Office demonstrate that the pursuit of significant prison sentences is a top priority of the
Office. See, e.g., United States v. Kirkeby, appeal pending, No. 93-1358NDF (8th Cir.);
United States v. Yankton, 986 F.2d 1225 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Desormeaux, 952
F.2d 182 (8th Cir. 1991), and No. 92-1695, 92-1742, 1993 WL 342550 (8th Cir. Sept. 9,
1993).
Even a zealous advocate of substantial sentences, however, must recognize that a
felony prosecution has value even if the conviction does not lead to a prison sentence. As
the Petite policy itself recognizes, a felony conviction in and of itself represents a significant
enough federal interest to justify authorization of subsequent federal prosecution following
a prior state or federal misdemeanor prosecution. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying
text. A federal felony prosecution following a prior tribal misdemeanor conviction carries
no less value. Although the goals of prosecution and sentencing are not advanced as much
as by imprisonment, these goals are advanced somewhat by a felony conviction in less
serious crimes covered by § 1153 of Title 18. See supra text accompanying notes 41-47.
Because a federal felony conviction does not go unnoticed within the Native American
community, even a felony conviction that results in no prison sentence has some deterrent
effect. The United States Probation Office's monitoring of the offender serves the goal of
incapacitation, though admittedly less effectively than does imprisonment. The United
States Attorney's Office felony prosecution sends the message to the community and the
victim that the offense is serious and worthy of a federal response, thus advancing the goal
of justice. Supervision of the convicted offender by the United States Probation Office and
that Office's ability to place offenders in treatment programs advance the goal of
rehabilitation. Furthermore, the goals of deterrence and incapacitation are advanced
somewhat by the inclusion of a federal felony conviction within the defendant's criminal
history for any future offenses, under the Sentencing Guidelines. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c) and
(o). Under the Sentencing Guidelines, an increased criminal history results in a more severe
sentence. See id. § 5A. Tribal convictions are not included in the defendant's criminal
history under the Guidelines. Id. § 4AI.2(i).
In the Azure case itself, the federal felony conviction resulted in a three month prison
sentence. Judgment, United States v. Azure, at 2. Therefore, Jensen and Rosenquist cannot
credibly argue that this prosecution was without effect.
Of course, not all Major Crimes Act violations are equally serious. In a world of
unlimited resources, prosecutors would prosecute all provable felonies. In the real world of
limited resources, prosecutors must occasionally forego prosecution of certain cases, so that
other cases can be prosecuted. In deciding whether to federally prosecute a less serious
Major Crimes Act violation, a United States Attorney can legitimately consider whether a
successful tribal prosecution has resulted in a significant sentence. If Jensen and Rosenquist
merely asserted that this is a legitimate factor for United States Attorneys to consider, their
point would be well taken. Instead, however, they incorrectly argue that federal
prosecutions contravene the inapplicable Petite policy, establish the existence of racist
motivation by federal prosecutors, and violate equal protection.
106. In the past, United States Attorneys have been criticized for failing to adequately
prosecute Indian country offenses. A 1975 Department of Justice task force noted that
some critics contended that this alleged underprosecution resulted from the race of the
crime victims:
"Indians often complain that if a person sticks a knife into his neighbor in Peoria,
Illinois, a major effort would be made to bring criminal justice sanctions to bear
on the offender. They contend that a similar crime occurring in Pine Ridge,
South Dakota, would go almost unnoticed. Indians feel that some federal
prosecutors have the attitude that offenders and victims of reservation crimes
are 'just a bunch of Indians."'
UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 13, at 151 (quoting UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON INDIAN MATTERS 42-
43 (1975)).
Prosecutors should never make decisions based upon the race of either victims or
defendants. Jensen and Rosenquist's proposed relinquishment of federal prosecution fol-
lowing tribal prosecution would be just such a policy.
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A recent Indian Major Crimes Act prosecution in the District
of North Dakota illustrates the perils and injustice of the non-
prosecution policy proposed by Jensen and Rosenquist. The
defendant in this federal aggravated sexual abuse case, United
States v. Yankton, 0 7 was originally prosecuted for a related misde-
meanor in tribal court.'0° Given the significant and unusual suffer-
ing of Yankton's rape victim, a lack of felony prosecution by the
only prosecutor who could bring a felony case, the United States
Attorney, would have left substantial interests unmet.
Yankton was thirty-nine years old when he raped his victim,
who was fifteen. 09 His victim became pregnant with twins. One
twin died in utero. Complications regarding the pregnancy
resulted in the hospitalization of Yankton's victim. She gave birth
to the surviving child by cesarean section. The baby girl was born
with osteogenesis imperfectis, a fatal disease that caused her bones
to be extremely brittle.1 0 Due to the severe pain associated with
this disease, the baby was on morphine throughout her short
life."' She died three weeks after birth. Her mother, Yankton's
rape victim, did not attend school from the time of the rape until
after the birth and death of her child." 2
Yankton's offense and the harm he caused were serious.
Because the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are based upon a his-
torical review of sentences, 1 3 the Guidelines are a rough gauge of
the severity of an offense. The district court, applying the Sen-
tencing Guidelines, sentenced Yankton to twelve years of impris-
onment" 4 without the possibility of parole." 5 In reaching this
sentence, the district court held that it could not take the rape
victim's pregnancy into account." 6 The United States Attorney
appealed the sentence, arguing that the pregnancy could be taken
into account. The Eighth Circuit agreed, remanding the case for
resentencing. 7 On remand, the district court sentenced Yankton
107. 986 F.2d 1225 (8th Cir. 1993).
108. United States v. Yankton, 986 F2d 1225, 1227 (8th Cir. 1993).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See Brief for Appellant at 8, United States v. Yankton (8th Cir. 1992) (Nos. 92-
1404ND and 92-1482ND).
112. Yankton, 986 F.2d at 1227.
113. U.S.S.G. § 1A.3, at 3-4.
114. Yankton, 986 F.2d at 1227.
115. Defendants sentenced under the federal Sentencing Guidelines are not eligible
for parole, but they are eligible for good time credit of 15% per year. See U.S.S.G. § 1A.3, at
2.
116. Yankton, 986 F.2d at 1226, 1228.
117. Id. at 1230.
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to thirteen years of imprisonment. 81 8
There are few, if any, governmental interests more compel-
ling than justice, including justice for all crime victims and com-
munities, regardless of race. By prosecuting Yankton and pursuing
a significant sentence, the United States Attorney's Office con-
firmed that the pain suffered by his rape victim and the harm to
the Native American community were substantial and worthy of
federal intervention and felony prosecution. Adoption of Jensen
and Rosenquist's nonprosecution proposal would send the opposite
message that this pain and harm is worthy only of a misdemeanor
prosecution and a sentence of less than one year." 19
C. NATIVE AMERICAN AND NON-NATIVE AMERICAN
DEFENDANTS DESERVE EQUAL TREATMENT
Furthermore, the authors' nonprosecution policy would cre-
ate serious equal protection concerns. The current United States
Attorney's Office policy of prosecuting individuals who commit
major crimes against Native Americans in Indian country without
regard to race treats all potential defendants equally. 120 Jensen
118. Order and Judgment Upon Resentencing, United States v. Yankton, Crim. No.
C2-91-17 (D. N.D. May 10, 1993).
119. The authors object to this response's condemnation of their proposed
nonprosecution policy for the serious offenses that violate the Indian Major Crimes Act,
stating, "It should be obvious through the tone of this article that the authors are speaking
of and concerned with only those crimes that do not leave substantial unvindicated federal
interests once the tribal court has adjudicated them, but nevertheless result in subsequent
federal prosecution." Compelling Interest, supra note 5, at n.94.
This statement ignores the "obvious" fact that Congress has determined that all
violations of the Indian Major Crimes Act result in substantial federal interests. The name
of the statute documents that Congress has determined that the listed offenses are "major"
crimes. It is also significant that only a limited number of offenses are included in the
statute. Many less serious acts that are felonies under state criminal codes are excluded. In
addition, it is noteworthy that, while not all traditional state code felonies are included in
the Indian Major Crimes Act, all Indian Major Crimes Act offenses are felonies. The felony
designation, in and of itself, demonstrates that these offenses represent significant federal
interests. Others have recognized the seriousness of Indian Major Crimes Act offenses. The
United States Commission on Civil Rights noted, "Offenses covered by the Major Crimes
Act are serious felony offenses." UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note
13, at 154-55. The Commission also observed that these crimes are "the offenses
constituting the greatest threat to the public safety of any community." Id. at 144.
Jensen and Rosenquist also offer no suggestions or guidelines whatsoever, other than
the "tone" of their article and their unexplained conclusion that the crimes of murder, rape,
and kidnapping merit federal prosecution, see Compelling Interest, supra note 5, at n.3, for
making the distinction that they propose between Indian Major Crimes Act offenses that
represent substantial federal interests and those that, in their view, do not. See id. at n.94.
Apparently, the authors believe that some major crimes are "major heinous," id., while
others are, presumably, just major, but they provide no basis for making this distinction.
Without such a definition of which offenses do not justify federal prosecution, the reader of
their article can only assume that their analysis applies to all of the major crimes outlawed
by the Indian Major Crimes Act.
120. Native American defendants who commit major crimes in Indian country are
prosecuted under § 1153 of Title 18. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). Non-Native
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and Rosenquist's proposed policy would result in differential
Americans are prosecuted under § 1152. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). See
supra text accompanying notes 37-47.
Jensen and Rosenquist imprecisely and inaccurately claim, "The rhetorical question
skirted by Mr. Easton (in this response) remains unanswered: Why are Indians routinely
prosecuted twice for the same crime while Caucasians are not?" Compelling Interest, supra
note 5, at n. 86. This "rhetorical question" is improperly stated in at least three significant
respects.
First, it is not the defendant's status as an Indian that results in a federal prosecution.
Both Indians and non-Indians are prosecuted federally when they commit major crimes in
Indian country. See supra notes 37-47 and accompanying text. This is a second prosecution
only when the defendant has previously been prosecuted by a tribe. Therefore, it is the
status of the forum in which the defendant was initially prosecuted, not the race of the
defendant, that may lead to a second prosecution. It is significant that, despite their
allegations of racism, Jensen and Rosenquist have not cited a single instance where an
Indian defendant was first prosecuted by a state and later prosecuted federally. This author
is aware of no such instance.
In addition, Jensen and Rosenquist cite no support for the proposition that successive
tribal and federal prosecutions are "routine." In some instances, a defendant is prosecuted
only in federal court, and not in tribal court. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
Conversely, there are numerous tribal prosecutions that are not followed by federal
prosecutions. In many of these cases, the criminal acts violate tribal codes, but do not
violate the Indian Major Crimes Act. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. Even in
those instances where an act violates both a tribal code and the Indian Major Crimes Act, a
defendant is often prosecuted only by the tribe, and not by the United States. See supra
notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
Finally, Jensen and Rosenquist's rhetorical question draws an unsupported distinction
between Indians and Caucasians. The law draws no such distinction. The distinctions in
tribal and federal prosecution treat Indians and non-Indians differently, see supra note 38
and accompanying text, but there are no distinctions among Caucasians and other non-
Indians.
Correctly stated, Jensen and Rosenquist's rhetorical question should be, "Why are
defendants who are subject to tribal jurisdiction occasionally prosecuted twice for the same
crime while those who are subject to state jurisdiction are not?" This article certainly does
not skirt this question or leave it unanswered. Rather, the article states the reasons for this
phenomenon: (1) the significant overlap between tribal and federal jurisdiction over
violent crimes, and the absence of a significant overlap between state and federal
jurisdiction over violent crimes, see supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text; (2) the
critical distinction between tribal courts, which have only misdemeanor jurisdiction, and
state courts, which have full felony jurisdiction, see supra text accompanying notes 54-66;
(3) the applicability of the Department of Justice's Petite policy in cases where the
defendant has previously been prosecuted by a state, and the inapplicability of this policy
when the defendant has previously been prosecuted by a tribe, see supra text
accompanying notes 67-79; and (4) the prosecutor's obligation to victims of violent crime,
which applies to the United States Attorney when the crime occurs in Indian country, but
to a state prosecutor when the crime occurs outside Indian country. See supra notes 48-51
and accompanying text.
The prosecution that Jensen and Rosenquist protest in their article, United States v.
Azure, No. C2-92-40-01 (D. N.D 1992), see Compelling Interest, supra note 5, at n.87, serves
as a fairly typical example of the differences between an initial prosecution in state court
and an initial prosecution in tribal court. Azure burglarized a home and stole property
worth almost $1,000. See supra note 105. Azure's crime occurred in the Turtle Mountain
Reservation. For illustrative purposes, one can compare Azure to a hypothetical defendant,
"Smith," who committed the same crime. It will be assumed that Smith committed his
crime in North Dakota, but not in any of North Dakota's Indian reservations.
Smith's race is entirely irrelevant. Regardless of whether he is or is not an Indian, a
Caucasian, or a member of any other race, he can only be prosecuted in state court unless
his crime violated a special federal statute. There is no general burglary statute in the
United States Code that would authorize the United States Attorney for the District of
North Dakota to prosecute Smith. However, the States Attorney for the county where the
burglary took place could prosecute Smith for the felony of burglary. See N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12.1-22-02 (1985). The Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians could only prosecute
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treatment.121
The authors' proposal would prohibit prosecution only when a
tribe has previously pursued a misdemeanor prosecution. A tribe
can only prosecute Native Americans, however. 122 Thus, the pro-
hibition of federal prosecution could only apply in favor of a
Native American. The United States Attorney would still prose-
cute non-Native Americans.123 Indeed, given the federal court's
exclusive jurisdiction over Indian country major offenses, 124 the
United States Attorney would have to prosecute these offenses,
unless major crimes on the reservation are to be ignored alto-
gether. Therefore, Native Americans who commit major crimes in
Indian country would receive the preferential treatment of a mis-
demeanor prosecution and punishment of only one year or less of
prison, while non-Native Americans would be subject to felony
prosecution and unlimited punishment. 21
Azure for a misdemeanor. See supra notes 61-63. Even if one assumes that Smith's
burglary violated some federal statute, which is highly unlikely, and that the required
federal nexus could be established, see supra note 49, the United States Attorney would be
faced with different considerations in deciding whether to prosecute Smith and whether to
prosecute Azure. The state prosecution of Smith would have been or, at a minimum, could
have been for a felony, while the tribe's prosecution of Azure could only be for a
misdemeanor. In addition, the Petite policy would require Assistant Attorney General
approval prior to a prosecution of Smith, but the policy is inapplicable in the case of Azure.
See supra text accompanying notes 67-79. Finally, the prosecutor's obligation to protect
citizens from burglaries and other major crimes rests with the State's Attorney in the case of
Smith, but with the United States Attorney in the case of Azure. See supra notes 48-51 and
accompanying text.
121. Jensen and Rosenquist suggest that the United States Attorney's prosecution of
Native American defendants raises equal protection concerns. See Compelling Interest,
supra note 5, at text accompanying nn. 103-121. This argument ignores that fact that the
United States Attorney's Office prosecutes both Native Americans and non-Native
Americans who commit major crimes in Indian country. Any unequal treatment results
from the tribes' ability to prosecute Native Americans, but not non-Native Americans, for
misdemeanors. It is the tribal misdemeanor prosecution, not the federal felony
prosecution, that distinguishes Native American defendants from non-Native American
defendants. While the Supreme Court has not yet squarely faced the issue of whether this
distinction raises equal protection concerns, its dicta in the Duro v. Reina opinion suggests
that the distinction is not unconstitutional. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990). The Duro
opinion suggests that the distinction is constitutionally acceptable because tribal
membership (and the resultant status as an "Indian" whom can be prosecuted by a tribe) is
voluntary. Id. at 694 ("Retained criminal jurisdiction over members is accepted by- our
precedents and justified by the voluntary character of tribal membership and the
concomitant right of participation in a tribal government, the authority of which rests on
consent.").
122. See supra note 38.
123. Non-Native Americans could be prosecuted under § 1152 of Title 18. See supra
text accompanying note 38.
124. See supra note 36.
125. This preferential treatment could not be avoided simply through a request from
the United States Attorney to the tribal prosecutor to forego tribal prosecution. Two
realities of the separate sovereignty of tribes and the federal government make this
impractical.
First, the United States Attorney neither has nor should have any control over the
tribal prosecutor. The tribal prosecutor is acting on behalf of a sovereign, the tribe, that is
separate from the federal government. Any attempt by the federal government to control
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VI. CONCLUSION
In a system where separate prosecutors representing separate
sovereigns have misdemeanor and felony prosecution responsibil-
ity, some defendants will inevitably be prosecuted by both prose-
cutors. It is important to note that this overlap results not from
malfeasance by either tribal or federal prosecutors. On the con-
trary, this overlap results when both prosecutors carry out the
duties of their offices by prosecuting offenses within their
jurisdiction. 126
Perhaps the current system separating felony and misde-
his or her exercise of prosecutorial discretion would be both a futile gesture and a perceived
infringement upon the sovereignty of the tribes, which the tribes hold dear. See infra notes
129, 133. Given the tribal fondness for sovereignty, the argument of shared prosecutorial
duties between federal and state prosecutors proposed by Jensen and Rosenquist is not
persuasive. See Compelling Interest, supra note 5, at nn.122-135.
Second, the United States Attorney's Office often does not even receive notice that a
Major Crimes Act offense has been committed until after a tribal prosecution is complete.
A tribal defendant often pleads guilty and is convicted and sentenced at his tribal
arraignment, which can occur as early as the same day as his offense. See, e.g., DEVILS LAKE
Sioux LAW AND ORDER CODE §§ 3-5-101 to -102. Indeed, Jensen and Rosenquist's
nonprosecution proposal would give tribal defendants even more incentive to enter early
guilty pleas, because a guilty plea would eliminate the possibility of a subsequent federal
prosecution. See Compelling Interest, supra note 5, at n.55 (citing Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109
U.S. 556 (1883) and quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978)).
As one commentator has noted, if a federal prosecution was forbidden after a tribal
prosecution, "[i]t is possible that tribal and federal prosecutors may become engaged in a
race to conviction in order that an adjudication in one court would not bar a trial in the
other." Vollmann, supra note 25, at 406. Although Jensen and Rosenquist find it
"interesting" that the federal investigation of the defendant in United States v. Lester "was
completed approximately six months after the tribal court sentencing," see Compelling
Interest, supra note 5, at n.140, this is not unusual. Major crimes on the Indian reservations
are investigated by geographically remote investigators, prosecuted by geographically
remote attorneys, and indicted by geographically remote grand juries that meet only a few
times each year. See UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 13, at 154.
In North Dakota, for example, the Federal Bureau of Investigation maintains offices in
Fargo, Grand Forks, Bismarck, and Minot, the United States Attorney's Office maintains
staffed offices in Fargo and Bismarck, and the grand jury meets in Fargo and Bismarck.
None of these four cities is in Indian country. In Arizona, some portions of the Navajo
reservation are more than 400 miles from the Phoenix office of the United States Attorney.
Vollmann, supra note 25, at 387 n.2. In addition, the Fifth Amendment requires a grand
jury indictment in federal felony cases, but this requirement has not been applied to non-
federal sovereigns. See CHARLES E. ToRcIA, II WHARTON'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 208
(1990 & Supp. 1992). The federal requirement of a grand jury indictment for felony
offenses alone can mean that a federal prosecution often can not even begin before a tribal
misdemeanor prosecution is completed.
126. In the past, United States Attorneys have been criticized for failing to adequately
prosecute Indian country major crimes. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
Prosecution of these crimes is a primary duty of the United States Attorney. See supra notes
1-3 and accompanying text.
Similarly, tribal prosecutors have the duty to prosecute tribal offenses in tribal court.
See, e.g., STANDING ROCK SIOUX TRIBE CODE OF JUSTICE § 1-506, reprinted in SELECTED
TRIBAL CODE PROVISIONS 108; TURTLE MOUNTAIN TRIBAL CODE § 1.0504, reprinted in
SELECTED TRIBAL CODE PROVISIONS 214.
The "dual" prosecutions that Jensen and Rosenquist protest occur when both the
United States Attorney and the tribal prosecutor meet the responsibilities of their offices by
prosecuting criminal offenses.
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meanor prosecution responsibility between the tribal and federal
prosecutor should be changed. Several alternatives could be
adopted, but each also has its problems.
For example, Congress could give the tribes full felony crimi-
nal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court, however, has decided that
the tribes cannot prosecute non-Native Americans. 127 Therefore,
expansion of tribal criminal jurisdiction would not obviate the
need for a nontribal prosecutor to enforce the law against non-
Native Americans.
Alternatively, Congress could eliminate tribal jurisdiction
entirely and give the federal courts misdemeanor 128 jurisdiction
over offenses in Indian country.' 29 The tribes would undoubtedly
object to such a serious degradation of their sovereignty,
127. See supra note 38.
128. Unless significant changes in the federal court system accompanied a grant of
misdemeanor jurisdiction to the federal courts, federal court misdemeanor jurisdiction
would be both unwieldy and inefficient. The substantial distances between many
reservations and the nearest federal courthouse, see supra note 125 and infra note 132,
would make federal court misdemeanor prosecutions of Indian country offenses
cumbersome. In addition, the limited resources of the United States District Courts, the
United States Attorneys' Offices, and the federal investigative agencies would be stretched
very thin.
Even in the current system of exclusive federal jurisdiction over most offenses,
including misdemeanors, committed by non-Indians in Indian Major Crimes Act states, see
supra note 36, the limited resources of federal courts, prosecutors, and investigative
agencies make misdemeanor prosecution a rarity. See Wood, supra note 36. An expansion
of federal misdemeanor jurisdiction to offenses committed by Indians would only
exacerbate these resource problems.
129. The trend of the court decisions suggests that tribal criminal jurisdiction may
eventually be ruled unconstitutional. Several years ago, the Supreme Court ruled that
tribes had no criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). Recently, the Court held that the tribes can not exercise
jurisdiction over Indians who are members of other tribes. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676,
691 (1990) ("Evidence on criminal jurisdiction is less clear, but on balance supports the view
that inherent tribal jurisdiction extends to tribe members only."); but see supra note 38
(outlining Congress's response to Duro).
The district court decision in Duro granted the nonmember Indian criminal defendant
a writ of habeas corpus based upon an equal protection analysis. The court held that tribal
prosecution of the nonmember Indian violated equal protection because the tribe could not
prosecute him if he was not an Indian. Duro, 495 U.S. at 682. This equal protection
argument received some support in the Court of Appeals. Judge Sneed's dissent from the
Ninth Circuit's reversal of the district court "stressed that recognition of jurisdiction ...
would place the nonmember Indian, unlike any other citizen, in jeopardy of trial by an
alien tribunal." Id. at 684 (interpreting Judge Sneed's dissent in Duro v. Reina, 851 F.2d
1136,1146-51 (9th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 495 U.S. 676 (1990)). The three judges who dissented
from the Ninth Circuit's denial of rehearing en banc "accepted petitioner's contention that
tribal jurisdiction subjected him to an impermissible racial classification and to a tribunal
with the potential for bias." Duro, 495 U.S. at 684 (interpreting the dissents from the
denial of the petition for rehearing in Duro v. Reina, 860 F.2d 1463 (1988), rev'd, 495 U.S.
676 (1990)).
Although equal protection concerns were not the basis for the Supreme Court decision
in Duro, it is easy to predict the next argument that will be made by a tribal defendant. A
defendant who is prosecuted by his own tribe could argue that the prosecution violated
equal protection, because the prosecution was based upon his Indian race.
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Congress' could extend Public Law 280 to all of Indian
country, thereby eliminating both tribal and federal jurisdiction
over Indian country crimes and giving the states jurisdiction over
these offenses. 132 This alternative, however, would also result in a
serious degradation of tribal sovereignty. 133
If these major revisions are not in order, perhaps the problems
of dual prosecution could be limited with less drastic changes that
would alter the current distribution of jurisdiction among the
tribes, the states, and the United States. For example, some of the
less serious crimes that are within the Indian Major Crimes Act,
such as theft, could be eliminated (or narrowed) and entrusted to
tribal and state jurisdiction.
A discussion of the merits of these alternatives would be both
130. Many supporters of tribal sovereignty interpreted the Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676
(1990), elimination of tribal court criminal jurisdiction over non member Indians, which
was later "overruled" by statute, as a major intrusion upon tribal sovereignty. See, e.g.,
Geoffrey M. Standing Bear, The Oliphant Road and the Implied Abrogation of Territorial
Sovereignty: A Challenge to Indian Nations, in Sovereignty Symposium IV. The Circles of
Sovereignty 71 (1991); Rennard Strickland, Indian Law and the Miner's Canary: The Signs
of Poison Gas, 39 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 483, 502-03 (1991); Sovereignty Prevails: Duro Case
Overturned, LAKOTA TIMES (Nov. 6, 1991).
Complete elimination of tribal court criminal jurisdiction would undoubtedly be
interpreted as an even more serious degradation of tribal sovereignty. See Vollmann, supra
note 25, at 388. Tribal sovereignty proponents have advocated a strengthening of tribal
courts, rather than a further erosion of their jurisdiction. See JUSTICE AND THE AMERICAN
INDIAN, supra note 14, at 52-53; INDIAN SELF-DETERMINATION, supra note 34, at 110
("[T]here must be recognition of the right of Indian tribes to devise court systems with
unique aspects of structure and procedure and with sufficient jurisdiction to permit
effective government of the reservation."); UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
supra note 13, at 177; Vollmann, supra note 25, at 411-12.
131. Actually, Congress, acting alone, might not be able to extend Indian country
crime jurisdiction to all states. Several state constitutions contain explicit abdications of
criminal jurisdiction over Indian country offenses, because the enabling acts for these states
required such provisions. See supra note 27. Although Congress could remove the
requirement for such provisions by statute, as it did in Public Law 280, these states might
still have to amend their constitutions in order to assume Indian country criminal
jurisdiction. See Act of Augnst 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280 § 6, 1953 U.S.C.C.A.N. (83 Stat.)
663, 665. In the present climate of limited state resources, states might be reluctant to
assume additional criminal jurisdiction.
132. One advantage of state, rather than federal, jurisdiction over major crimes would
be the location of state prosecutors and investigators. As the Solicitor General of the United
States recently noted, "Federal investigative agents, prosecutors, and courts often are much
farther from the scene of an on-reservation crime than are their state and local
counterparts. This distance [to federal officers] also imposes a burden on victims and
witnesses." Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae on Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
Arizona v. Flint, No. 88-603, at 5, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3228 (1989).
133. See supra note 130. Tribal-state relationships have often been even more
acrimonious than tribal-federal relationships. See UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, supra note 13, at 41-54; Strickland, supra note 130, at 491-98.
Wholesale elimination of tribal and federal criminal jurisdiction in favor of state
jurisdiction is not likely, given recent support for tribal sovereignty. Under the 1968 Indian
Civil Rights Act, a tribe must consent before any state assumes criminal jurisdiction. See
UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 13, at 144; Vollmann, supra
note 25, at 391.
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interesting and helpful. 134 Perhaps the perceived injustice of
"dual" prosecution of Native Americans who commit major crimes
in Indian country is substantial enough to mandate adoption of one
of these solutions. Unfortunately, Jensen and Rosenquist
eschewed a discussion of these or other alternatives, in favor of a
blistering attack upon the United States Attorney's Office for fulfil-
ling its responsibility to prosecute major crimes occurring in
Indian country.
Under the current statutory scheme, only the United States
Attorney can bring those who commit major crimes in Indian
country to justice. To fulfill the duties of his or her Office, the
United States Attorney must advance the government's compel-
ling interest in equal justice for all by prosecuting major Indian
country crimes zealously. Doing anything less would lock Native
American crime victims and Native American communities
outside our nation's criminal justice system, a result that would
surely be an application of our nation's laws "with 'an evil eye and
an unequal hand.' "135
134. For discussions of possible alternatives, see, e.g., Richard V. Thomas, Indian
Country: An Imperfect Concept of Sovereignty in the Criminal Law, in Sovereignty
Symposium III: The Dialogue Continues (1990); Vollmann, supra note 25, at 407-12.
135. See Compelling Interest, supra note 5, at text following n.146 (quoting Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886).

